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Abstract 
A lot of empirical studies argue that bank privatization has positive effect on bank 
performance. The purpose of this paper is to go through the bank privatization literature 
and to test this argument in three fast-track transition countries (Czech, Poland and 
Hungary).The empirical results of this paper indicate that privatization does have 
significantly positive effect on bank profitability and loan portfolio quality improvement, 
but has slight effect with operating cost efficiency in these countries. The research uses 
ordinary regression to examine the relationship between ownership structure change 
( the symbol of privatization progress) and annual profitability, operating cost and non 
performing loans respectively, additionally we use means of those three performance 
indicators in CPH countries and put those three indicators together along with the mean 
of ownership structure changes to test the correlation among them. Overall, the findings 
support the argument. As china is embarking on significant bank privatization now, and 
china shares a lot of sameness with the three fast-track transition countries politically 
and economically, the researcher hopes this paper can be somehow useful to china’s 
bank industry. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Motivation 
 
 
After WTO entry in December 2001, China is embarking on a significant reform of 
its banking industry, partially privatizing its dominant “Big Four” state-owned banks 
and taking on minority foreign ownership of these institutions.  
 
In 2003 the government created China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) 
to achieve better monitoring of the banking industry. Other banking laws were    
subsequently issued, including revisions of the 1995 Central Bank Law and 1995 
Commercial Bank Law. Also in 2003, the State Council granted US $45 billion to Bank 
of china (BOC) and China construction Bank (CCB) to increase capital, instead of 
writing off bad loans. New systems of external and internal monitoring of asset quality 
were also implemented. 
 
Foreign investment in domestic banks became intensified in 2003, under the new 
rules, foreigners can own up to 25% of a domestic bank, with any single investor 
allowed up to 20%, with regulatory approval. Examples of strategic foreign investments 
post-WTO includes Citigroup’s 4.6% share in Shanghai Pudong Development Bank (a 
Shanghai-based commercial bank, about 40% state-owned) and a consortium including 
Hang Seng Bank Ltd., IFC, took a 24.98% stake in Industrial Bank (a southern Fujian 
Province-based bank, 34% held by Fujian Provincial Bureau of Finance). 
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In 2004, New bridge Capital Ltd. (a U.S. investor group) bought 18% stake of 
Shenzhen Development Bank Co. (a national Shenzhen-based listed bank), the first time 
that foreign investors came to be the largest and controlling shareholder of a national 
domestic bank. Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp. (a unit of HSBC Holding PLC.) 
also agreed to purchase 19.9% stake of Bank of Communications (the fifth-largest bank 
in China, 23.76% owned by Ministry of Finance of China) and it secured the right to 
double this share when regulations allow. However, after the investment, the Ministry 
of Finance increased its shares so that it remains the largest shareholder, potentially a 
sign that that the Chinese government remains caution about foreign investment in 
banking. 
 
The partial privatization has now spread to three of the Big Four banks.On June 17, 
2005, Bank of America made a deal to buy a 9% stake in China Construction Bank 
(CCB, one of China's Big Four state-owned banks) and committed to invest a further 
US $500 million to maintain its ownership level when CCB proceeds with the planned 
IPO. Bank of America also has a nonexclusive, 5 1/2-year option to increase its stake to 
19.9% at the price of shares in the IPO. Bank of America's deal with CCB is the first 
foreign equity investment in one of the Big Four banks that dominate banking in 
mainland China (Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition, June 17, 2005, pg. A.3).  
 
At the same month (June 2005), China Construction Bank signed a deal with 
Temasek from Singapore who would to pay US $1.5 billion for a 5.1% stake and then 
invest a further US $1 billion in shares when the bank goes public. (International Herald 
Tribune, 2005/9/21). In September 2005, Royal Bank of Scotland and Temasek have 
agreed to buy each of 10% stake in Bank of China (BOC, second-largest among the Big 
Four state-owned banks) (International Herald Tribune, 2005/9/21). On Aug 31, 2005, a 
group of foreign investors, including Goldman Sachs Group Inc., American Express Co., 
and Allianz AG have agreed to purchase 10% shares of ICBC (Industrial & Commercial 
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Bank of China, one of China's biggest state-owned commercial banks) at the price of 
more than US $3 billion. 
 
China Construction Bank (CCB) has now gone public. On October 20, 2005, CCB 
issued 26.49 billion shares to investors in the Hong Kong stock exchange, raising HK 
$62.25 billion (i.e., US $8 billion) with a group of underwriters including China 
International Capital Corp., Credit Suisse First Boston (a unit of Credit Suisse Group), 
and Morgan Stanley, thus becoming the first among Big Four to go public and the 
largest issuer in the world among the IPOs that were issued within last four years. 
Moreover, Bank of America (which purchased a 9% stake earlier in the year) has 
promised to buy US $500 million of CCB’s shares in the IPO, and Temasek (which 
purchased a 4.49% stake earlier) said it will buy an additional US $1 billion of CCB’s 
shares in the offering (Wall Street Journal, Oct 20, 2005, p. 1). 
 
Eight city commercial banks had also reached agreement with foreign investors by 
September 2005. Foreign institutions have spent about US $17 billion buying sizable 
stakes in Chinese domestic banks over the past three years. The Chinese regulators are 
considering further raising the permitted level of foreign investment in Chinese banks. 
(Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition, Sept 15, 2005, pg. A18)  
 
It is under such background that this thesis studies for bank privatization in three 
fast-track transition countries. But before we go ahead, we need to ask why we choose 
these three fast-track transition economies? First, let’s take a brief bird eye view on 
Chinese banking system Pre-WTO entry. The Chinese socialist banking system was 
established in the late 1940s following the system in the former Soviet Union. Under 
reforms begun in 1978, the banking system expanded by establishing several large 
state-owned commercial banks, and splitting the Big Four state-owned banks and the 
lending functions from the People’s Bank Of China (the central bank) .These banks 
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were initially limited to only serve their designated sector of the economy as policy 
lending for the government, and lacked incentives to compete. The asset quality of the 
state-owned banks deteriorated significantly during the 1990s, as the state-owned banks 
made most of their loans to state-owned enterprises (SOE), which had little incentive to 
repay.  
 
Two major legislative reforms occurred in 1995. The 1995 Central Bank Law of 
China confirmed PBOC as the central bank and substantially reduced the influence of 
local governments on credit allocation decisions. The 1995 Commercial Bank Law of 
China officially termed the major state-owned banks as “commercial banks,” and 
directed them more towards commercial business based on market principles instead of 
policy lending. New banks also entered the market in the mid-1990s. By the end of 
1999, there were 12 national shareholding commercial banks, with total assets of 
1,447.7 billion yuan (PBOC 2000). The central government also allowed local 
governments to establish local banks in the mid-1990s by consolidating local rural and 
urban cooperatives as city cooperative banks. By the end of 1999, 90 such banks were 
operating in China, with total assets of 554.7 billion yuan (PBOC 2000). 
 
The Chinese government has been very conservative in allowing foreign bank 
entry. Foreign banks were first permitted to make deposits and loans in local currency 
(i.e., yuan) in the Shanghai Pudong New Zone in 1996. By the end of 1999, 25 foreign 
banks had permission to conduct local currency business, with totals of 21,813 million 
yuan in assets, 11,341 million yuan in loans, and 15,100 million yuan in deposits. Total 
assets of all foreign banks in China reached US $32,844 million (nearly 272 billion 
yuan) by 1999. Regulatory permission for foreign investors to hold minority stakes in 
domestic banks was forthcoming more slowly. The first case was in 1996, when Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) bought a 1.9% stake in China Everbright Bank3 (a national 
shareholding commercial bank, majority state owned). But after WTO entry, Foreign 
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investment in domestic banks became intensified as we have discussed above. 
 
As Chinese banking system and political system followed former Soviet Union 
before reforms begun in 1978 and since then china economy has experienced significant 
change and rapid growth and this rapidly developing economy has been intensively 
market-oriented now, there are similar background between china’s economy and the 
three fast-track transition economies (Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary), it seems to 
be logical for this study to focus mainly on bank privatization in these economies.  
 
 
1.2 Method 
 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the bank performance under privatization 
in three fast-track transition countries, briefly spoken CPH in this paper, namely Czech 
Republic, Poland and Hungary. We choose these countries because there are similar 
background between china and them as we have mentioned above. Besides, both have 
similar inefficient banking sector and not well developed legal and financial 
infrastructure. 
 
Further, the profit efficiency findings of banks in china suggest that in terms of 
majority ownership, foreign banks are the most efficient, followed by private, 
domestically-owned banks, with state-owned institutions – particularly the Big Four – 
being measured as least efficient. These results are consistent with findings for these 
transition nations. The cost efficiency findings from china present similar evidences to 
these three transition countries that state-owned institutions have relatively high 
measured cost efficiency – possibly due to government subsidies on the cost side. 
 
Finally, similar investigation suggests any subsidies on the cost side are more than 
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consumed by poor loan revenues as state-owned banks have much higher rates of 
nonperforming loans both in china and in these countries. 
 
The theoretical literature indicates that private banks, or in this case, privatized 
banks should outperform government-owned banks, but Whether is there a relationship 
between bank performance and privatization? Empirical evidence is needed to confirm 
this theoretical hypothesis for banks in these transition countries. 
 
This paper assesses the effect of privatization on bank performance in these 
countries over the period 1995-2004. CPH undertook a major privatization program 
during this period, divested banks constituting more than 90% of total banking system 
assets. However, this period was also characterized by other major changes in the 
financial system. We therefore evaluate the effects of privatization on bank performance 
relative to the commercial and all other banks during the starting privatization, 
privatization and post privatization period, namely, 1995-2004. Specifically, we assess 
the performance of privatized banks, i.e. the return on assets (ROA) as well as the share 
of non-performing loans (NPL), operating cost (OC) relative to other banks in the 
financial system and relative to their performance before privatization. 
We use state ownership structure change as the symbol of privatization and three 
indicators (ROA,NPL,OC) as the symbols of bank performance and apply different 
ordinary regression tests on state ownership cut and bank performance. Our results 
indicate performance improvement due to privatization although the results are subject 
to some research limitations. First, poor data quality makes it not so easy to find very 
significant relationships between bank characteristics such as ownership and bank 
performance. The fact that we find significant and robust relationships in spite of these 
shortcomings makes us more confident in our findings. Second, limited information on 
the privatization transactions and the individual banks limit our analysis to a primarily 
statistical one. We try to offset these hurdles with a thorough sensitivity analysis. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers theoretical 
background on bank privatization. Section 3 describes our sample data and the 
methodology to test the effect of privatization on bank performances. Section 4 presents 
our main results and analysis confirming the positive effect of privatization on bank 
performance .Section 5 concludes our discussion and research. We analyzes the 
relationship between ownership structure change and loan portfolio quality, 
profitability ,cost efficiency by using 576 annual observations over 1995-2004 on 
commercial and all other banks in these three countries that have been privatized and to 
provide the support about effect of privatization on bank performance. 
 
 
1.3 Hypothesis 
 
 
Before this paper, lots of empirical researches on this issue suggesting that there 
has been existing a positive effect of privatization on bank performance. This research is 
based on a deductive approach to data collection and testing of significance about 
privatization. We mainly collect data of state ownership change (Privatization), return 
on assets, operating cost, non performing loans (the three indicators of bank 
performance) from banking sector performance annual reports made by Financial 
Supervision Authorities, National banks and bank associations in CPH countries, as 
well as annual reports of individual large banks over 1995-2004. Following the above 
background, now this paper has its own question: Whether there is a relationship 
between bank performance and privatization? Therefore, the hypothesis to be tested in 
this research is:  
H0: Bank privatization improves bank performance. 
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2. Review of literature 
 
 
 2.1 State ownership versus private ownership 
 
 
There is an enormous theoretical and empirical literature on state versus private 
ownership of non-financial firms. This is surveyed in Megginson(2005). Economists 
have offered four principle reasons why state ownership will be inherently less efficient 
than private ownership. First, SOE managers will have weaker and adverse incentives 
than will managers of privately owned firms because no individual or group has a clear 
interest or stake in the assets of the enterprise, and thus will be less diligent in 
maximizing revenues and minimizing costs. Second, state enterprises will be subject to 
less intense monitoring by owners, both because of collective action problems-potential 
monitors have less incentive to carefully observe managerial performance because they 
bear all the costs of doing so but reap only a fraction of the rewards-and because there 
are few methods of effectively disciplining SOE managers in the event that sub-par 
performance is detected. Third, the politicians who oversee SOE operations cannot 
credibly commit to bankrupting poorly performing SOEs, or even to withholding 
additional subsidized funding, so state enterprises inevitably face soft budget constraints. 
The final, and in many ways most compelling, critique of state ownership is that SOEs 
will be inefficient by design, since they are created specifically so that politicians and 
bureaucrats can maximize their institutional and individual self-interest and power 
rather than the wider public interest in society. These theories fit with the empirical 
findings that state-owned enterprises have been used in developing countries to finance 
politically motivated projects or provide subsidized finance to favored groups, and that 
they open too many offices and hire too many employees ( Kikeri, Nellis, and Shirley 
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1992 and World Bank 1995). The logical conclusion of these theories is that the State 
should leave productive activity to the private sector. In recent years, a large number of 
studies have examined the state versus private ownership of banking, and the overall 
picture points to a similar conclusion. 
 
State ownership of banks varies widely by regions, according to data from the BCL 
surveys of banking. South Asian (SAR) countries have the highest share of banking 
sector assets held by government-controlled banks, followed by the transition countries 
of Europe and Central Asia (ECA), Africa (AFR), Latin America and the Carribean 
(LAC), East Asia and the Pacific (EAP), the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), 
and finally, the OECD countries. During the past 15 years, over 250 commercial banks 
have been fully or partially privatized by governments of 59 countries. The extent of 
privatization of state-owned banks has varied widely. From 1999 to 2002, Africa had 
the steepest reductions in state ownership of banks, ignoring the extensive privatization 
in ECA and LAC earlier in the decade. East Asia and the OECD countries maintained 
their levels of state ownership, while South Asia and MENA showed slight increases in 
state ownership, partly because of state intervention in some troubled private sector 
banks. The impact of privatization on the banking sector performance has varied across 
countries and among banks, obviously depending on, among other factors, management, 
regulatory and supervisory structures, degree of competition and the differences in the 
way the banks have responded to competitive pressure.  
 
In general, it seems that bank privatization has had a significantly positive impact 
on the banking sector as a whole. Bonin et al. (2005) test whether privatization 
improves the financial and operating performance of the 10 largest banks in each of the 
six central and east Europe transition economies over the period 1994-2002. After 
unsuccessful partial privatizations in the early and mid-1990s, most of the privatized 
banks were recapitalized and then sold to foreign strategic investors. Their dataset has 
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471 annual observations, and they document significant performance improvement after 
privatization. They also find that privatized banks begin to compete successfully for 
fee-for-service businesses. The performance of privatized banks in the late 1990s is 
significantly better than state-owned banks and becomes comparable to foreign 
Greenfield banks. The most significant impact of privatization on commercial banks in 
the Caribbean has been in the area of customer service and product innovation. Most of 
the banks that have been privatized indicate that there has been a considerable 
improvement in customer service. This has been reflected in better range of products 
and services to customers. Many banks have now introduced efficient delivery channels, 
such as Automated Teller Machines (ATMs), debit cards and some are now in the 
process of introducing internet and electronic banking. All of these have been made 
possible by the rapid development in information technology. Customer service has 
become increasingly the main area in which banks in the region compete. The collusive 
behavior of banks in determining interest rates as well as the lack of product 
differentiation have forced the banks to improve their customer service significantly. 
( ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 
2001)  
La Porta et al.(2002)find that Government ownership retard financial system 
development and restrict economic growth rates, higher government ownership in 1970 
is associated with significantly slower subsequent financial development and lower 
growth in per capita income and productivity. Bonin et al (2002) examine the impact of 
ownership structure on bank performance in the six transition economies of Bulgaria, 
Crotia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania, they find robust evidence 
that profitability is higher for fully private banks than for banks with some state 
ownership. Barth et al (2004) argue that government ownership of banks is negatively 
correlated with favorable banking outcomes and positively linked with corruption. 
However, government ownership does not retain an independent, robust association 
with bank development, efficiency or stability when other features of the regulatory and 
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supervisory environment are controlled for. On the other hand, there is certainly no 
evidence, even in weak institutional settings, that government-owned banks are 
associated with positive outcomes. Cornett et al (2003) test performance difference 
between privately owned and state-owned banks in sixteen Far East countries from 1989 
through 1998, they find that state owned banks are significantly less profitable than 
privately owned banks due to state banks’ lower capital ratios, greater credit risk, lower 
liquidity and lower management efficiency. While the performance of all banks 
deteriorates significantly at the beginning of the Asian economic crisis in 1997 and 
1998, state bank’s performance deteriorates more than did that of private banks and 
performance differences are most acute in those countries where government 
involvement in the banking system is the greatest. Economic growth is also slower in 
these countries, and there is less financial development. Weintraub and Nakane (2005) 
go through the privatization experience of roughly 250 Brazilian banks over the period 
1990-2001. The authors find that bank size and ownership are important determinants of 
productivity. In particular, they find that state owned banks are significantly less 
productive than private banks and that privatization significantly increase productivity. 
 
The most common findings for developing nations are that on average, foreign 
banks are more efficient than or approximately equally efficient to private, domestic 
banks. Both of these groups are typically found to be significantly more efficient on 
average than state-owned banks, but there are variations on all of these findings. To 
illustrate, some research using data from the transition nations of Eastern Europe finds 
foreign banks to be the most efficient on average, followed by private, domestic banks, 
and then state-owned banks (Bonin, Hasan, and Wachtel 2005a,b). However, another 
study of transition nations finds the mixed result that foreign banks are more cost 
efficient, but less profit efficient than both private, domestic and state-owned banks 
(Yildirim and Philippatos 2003). Claessens, kunt and Huizinga(1998) examine the 
extent of foreign ownership in 80 national markets over the 1988-1995 period, and find 
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that foreign banks achieve higher profits than domestic banks in developing countries. 
Clarke et al (2001), Majnoni et al(2003),Bonin et al (2005) and Djankov et al (2005) 
document similar findings about foreign bank ownership’s efficiency. A study using 28 
developing nations from various regions finds foreign banks to have the highest profit 
efficiency, followed by private, domestic banks, and then state-owned banks (Berger, 
Hasan, and Klapper 2004). For cost efficiency, the private, domestic banks rank higher 
than the foreign banks, but both are still much more efficient than state-owned banks. 
Two studies using Argentine data (prior to the crisis in 2002) find roughly equal 
efficiency for foreign and private, domestic banks, and that both are more efficient on 
average than state-owned banks (Delfino 2003, Berger, Clarke, Cull, Klapper, and Udell 
2005). A study employing Pakistani information finds foreign banks are more profit 
efficient than private, domestic banks and state-owned banks, but all of these groups 
have similar average cost efficiency (Bonaccorsi di Patti and Hardy 2005). Finally, a 
study of banks in India finds that foreign banks are more efficient on average than 
private, domestic banks (Bhattacharya, Lovell, and Sahay 1997). Bonin, Hasan, and 
Wachtel (2005) provide evidence that on average, foreign banks are more efficient than 
domestic banks in developing countries. Foreign banks headquartered in developed 
countries have generally superior managerial expertise/experience, access to capital, use 
of hard-information technologies, and ability to diversify risk in most developing host 
countries, where domestic institutions have not acquired comparable skills. 
 
In sum, state owned banks are less efficient than privately owned banking sectors, 
foreign banks are more efficient than or approximately equally efficient to private banks 
and state domination of banking imposes increasingly severe penalties on those 
countries with the largest state banking sectors, but the question is under what 
circumstances privatization of banks will improve performance over continued state 
ownership.   
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2.2 Circumstances for a successful privatization 
 
2.2.1 The institutional framework matters. 
  
Although there are strong theoretical arguments against state ownership, but it does 
not necessarily follow that privatization will cure these problems. In any event, a 
number of countries had already learned the demerits of public ownership of banks. 
Inefficient operations and banking failures were enough testimony of the demerits of 
State ownership of banks in many countries. In fact, in many developing countries, the 
issue was not whether financial sector privatization was necessary, but the institutional 
framework in order to maximize the benefits from the process. 
 
 A lot of studies believe that Political objectives, poor information, and 
principal/agent problems, underdeveloped capital markets, weak court systems, 
inadequate procedures for bankruptcy or takeover etc. will all prevent privatized firms 
from performing efficiently, especially in developing countries where these market and 
institutional failures are common (Adam, Cavendish, and Mistry 1992; Caves 1990; 
Commander and Killick 1988; Cook and Kirkpatrick 1988; 1997; Stiglitz 1999). From 
1991 to 1997 Mexico has conducted two experiments with its banking system, the first 
experiment failed and the second experiment was disappointing . The first one led to a 
banking system that became insolvent within four years and that had to be bailed out at 
a cost estimated at $65 billion. The second one produced a banking system that is 
profitable and stable, but that is risk averse. It therefore extends only modest amounts of 
credit to firms and households. The ratio of private sector lending to GDP in Mexico is 
only 11%, an extraordinarily low figure in relationship to that of other middle-income 
developing countries. There were two fundamental flaws in the Mexico privatization 
experiment. The first flaw was that Mexico had weak institutions to assess the 
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creditworthiness of borrowers ex ante and enforce the contract rights of bankers ex post. 
The second flaw was that the Mexican government faced a serious fiscal crisis and thus 
sought to maximize the prices at auction for the banks, political economy fundamentally 
shaped the process of privatization. In order to get Mexico’s bankers to pay high prices, 
however, the government was compelled to make a series of decisions that reduced the 
incentives of bank directors, bank depositors, and bank regulators to enforce prudent 
behavior by the privatized banks. Consistent with its goal of maximizing prices on offer, 
the government also did not bring Mexico’s accounting standards in line with generally 
accepted accounting standards.  (Stephen Haber 2004) 
 
Chile was the forerunner and had privatized 19 of 20 State-owned banks by 1973. 
However, the initial phase of privatization in Chile led to a financial crisis, as the 
prudential and regulatory framework was ill-suited to the fairly rapid liberalization. This 
led to renationalization and eventually to a second wave of privatization that was more 
successful. Argentina, like other Latin American countries, was affected by banking 
sector problems, including the low mobilization of deposits, and non-performing loans 
provided the impetus to privatization. Privatization was so widespread that by 2000, 
State-owned banks had declined to 15 from 40 in1990. In Brazil also, the government 
continues to privatize State-owned banks. In 2000, two large regional banks, Banestado 
and Banespa were privatized. Meanwhile, in Peru, Banco Continental made a public 
offering of shares amounting to US$256 million in 1995. 
 
Even in the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), a number of financial reforms and 
liberalization policies were undertaken aimed at deepening the financial sector and 
increasing available resources for investment. Almost all of the LDCs have allowed the 
entry of new private sector banks and non-bank financial institutions. Again, the 
privatization were not gone successfully because of weak regulation and supervision, 
not well developed financial and legal system. (Brownbridge and Gayi, 1997). 
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2.2.2 Macroeconomic stability matters 
 
In most of the Asian developing countries, increased private sector participation in 
the financial sector was associated with greater financial depth, measured by growth in 
bank deposits and broad money supply (M2) to GDP3. This was because many of these 
countries had attained macroeconomic stability, which provided a platform for growth 
in the financial sector. In Bangladesh and Nepal, for instance, bank deposits grew by 
around 8 percentage points of GDP between 1985 and 1995. Financial depth improved 
in some African countries, such as Botswana and Uganda, but weakened in others, 
including Tanzania, Zambia and Malawi. The worsening situation in some of these 
countries, in any event, stemmed not from purely financial difficulties, but from 
macroeconomic instability, particularly high inflation and public sector deficits, and 
political instability in others. 
 
2.2.3 Privatization mode and strategies matter 
 
Economists have long noted the importance of properly sequencing financial sector 
reform and liberalization. The sequencing may be divided into three stages 
(Sundararajan, 1994 and Alexander et al, 1995). The fist stage is preparatory such as: 
Introduction of a minimal program of financial restructuring policies to deal with fixed 
rate loans, selected nonperforming loans, capital adequacy and subsidized selective 
credit; Review of legal and organizational arrangements for banking supervision; 
Strengthen the licensing and entry regulations and put in place a framework for orderly 
intervention and liquidation of banks. The second stage is to initiate market 
development including: The reform of commercial bank accounting and bank reporting 
systems; The prudential regulations, particularly loans classification and provision, 
credit concentration limits, credit appraisal guidelines and foreign exchange exposure 
rules based on new accounting standards; Strengthen the capital adequacy norms in line 
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with bank restructuring strategy; Active pursuit of Institutional development of banks, 
Formulation of a comprehensive program of bank restructuring, bank liquidations, loan 
recovery and loan workout arrangements; Implementation of simple financial 
restructuring policies for banks. The third stage is to strengthen financial market 
Continuation of comprehensive reforms to foster bank and enterprise restructuring 
systematically in lines with the program designed in the second stage. Recapitalizing 
and restructuring of state-owned banks followed rapidly by their privatization to an 
independent strategic investor aligns incentives properly. Restructuring must include 
both a clean up of the balance sheet and a change in on going lending practices to avoid 
moral hazard problems of continuing bailouts. Effective methods of dealing with bad 
loans prior to or during the privatization process are essential. The early 
recapitalizations of the Czech banks were not gone well because non-performing loans 
and soft lending practices continued and future bailouts became necessary. By contrast, 
the continual recapitalizations of Hungarian banks were successful because bad loans 
were ultimately written off completely and privatization to independent foreign strategic 
investor rapidly left Hungary with the strongest banking sector in the region .In a 
number of Caribbean countries, including Jamaica, the Netherlands Antilles and 
Trinidad and Tobago, improper sequencing of reforms and regulation led to bank 
failures that impacted negatively on the financial sector for some time.( ECONOMIC 
COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 2001) 
 
The credible transfer of control from the state is the crucial aspect of a successful 
bank privatization program. During the first unsuccessful round of privatization in the 
Czech Republic and Poland, when the governments divested more of its shares, 
Performance improved somewhat, but the subsequent divestiture of all government 
shares led to unambiguous performance gains. Comparing banks within Brazil and 
Nigeria leads to a similar conclusion: government ownership is associated with weaker 
bank performance. Performance improved in Brazil’s fully privatized banks but 
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remained unchanged in the state restructured banks (Beck, Crivelli, and Summerhill 
2003). Poland lost its credibility with an inconsistent policy that switched from 
attracting a strategic foreign investor to attempting to arrange two large politically 
motivated bank mergers, and thus, delayed this crucial transfer of control and finally 
slowed the momentum of bank privatization due to a fear of foreign dominance of the 
banking sector. Hungary, on the other hand, gained credibility when it ceded control of 
its largest banks to strategic foreign investors soon after recapitalization and 
restructuring (Abarbanell, Jeffrey S. and John P. Bonin 1997). Voucher privatization in 
Czech Republic resulted in the transfer of less than fifty percent of the bank shares to 
individual and investment funds with no dominant strategic owner emerging and the 
dispersed ownership is not conducive to achieving the primary goal of independent 
governance. (Snyder, Edward A. and Roger C. Kormendi 1997) 
 
Foreign ownership and participation is an essential and inevitable part of bank 
privatization. Fundamental reasons why foreign strategic investors are important to the 
banking industry are such that Foreign ownership helps clarify private sector control 
independent of the government, transfer modern banking technology, increase 
competition and the international integration of financial markets , reduces the potential 
for politicization of bank lending and the likelihood of financial crises and Foreign 
banking interest is a genuine market test of the value and soundness of domestic banks 
etc. (Bonin et al 1997).Hungary has been more accommodating on this issue and now 
has the strongest banking sector in the region. Poland has been slower to recognize the 
importance of foreign participation in banking to smooth its way into Europe. The 
Czech Republic is yet to acknowledge fully the necessary role of foreign banking. 
Privatization to insiders has been relatively unsuccessful. Privatized firms in transitional 
economies will be less efficient if they were sold to their managers and workers since 
this may prevent necessary restructuring and limit capital infusion (Earle et. al. 1995; 
Barberis et al 1996; Dyck 1999; Claessens and Djankov 1999; and Nellis 1999). 
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2.3 Factors affecting bank privatization 
 
Economic factors are significant determinants of bank privatization in both 
developing and developed countries. A common objective of privatizations is to raise 
revenue for the government. Haber (2005) and Verbrugge et al (2000) find that 
governments appear to structure SOB privatizations in order to maximize the proceeds 
from the sale. Governments frequently use the proceeds from privatization to offset 
budget deficits.( Megginson et al 1994) Poorly performing banks are more likely to be 
privatized than those performing well.(Beck et al 2005, Berger et al 2005, and Clarke 
and Cull 2002)Governments facing an economic crisis, such as systemic bank failures, 
are more likely to privatize. (Clarke and Cull 1997,,2002 and World Bank 1995) 
 
Privatization through public share offerings can jumpstart stock-market 
development and trigger gains in economic growth and efficiency. For example, the 
privatization of large banks through share offerings should enhance the liquidity of the 
nation’s equity market. With more shareholders, the market becomes more efficient. 
This encourages more firms going to public and the capital market experiences rapid 
growth.(Perotti and Oijen 2001, Subrahmanyam and Titman 1999) A government may 
also use SOB privatizations to enhance the country’s private banking sector. (Boehmer 
et al 2005) 
 
Higher levels of provincial unemployment and higher shares of public employees 
reduces the likelihood of privatization.(Clarke and Cull 2002) Larger banks are less 
likely than smaller banks to be privatized.(Clarke and Cull 2002) In addition to 
economic characteristics, political and legal factors also influence the privatization 
decision. (Denis and McConnell 2003) Politicians choose to privatize when the political 
benefits of privatization exceed the political costs (Clarke and Cull 2002 ). Less stable 
governments may lack the ability to effectively enforce property and contractual rights 
 21 
and thus more possible to privatize banking sectors. (Svensson1998, Clauge et al 1996) 
Since politicians who are more accountable to voters may be less willing to expropriate 
value from SOEs, these politicians should view privatization as a more viable option. 
Therefore, greater accountability to voters, by limiting the ability to extract political 
benefits from SOBs, should increase the likelihood of privatization. 
 
Beck et al (2001) identify the economic orientation of each country’s ruling 
government, classifying right-wing governments as those that favor less state control 
over the economy and left-wing governments as those that exert more state control. 
Megginson et al (2004) use similar measures of ideology and find that a government’s 
economic orientation figures significantly in its privatization decisions. 
 
After examining the political economy of sales of thirteen banks by Argentine 
provincial governments after the passage of the April 1991 Convertibility Act, Clarke 
and Cull (2002) conclude that overstaffing tends to reduce the probability of 
privatization because the post-sale staff cuts needed will be too politically painful and 
that the onset of the Tequila Crisis in 1995 increased the likelihood of privatization by 
raising the financial costs of continued state bank subsidization. 
 
2.4 Method to privatize 
  
Governments usually choose one of three techniques to privatize: asset sales, 
share-issue privatization, or voucher privatizations. 
Boehmer et al. (2003) examines 270 transactions from 51 countries over the period 
1982-2000, which raised a total of €119 billion for divesting governments, find that 
46.7% of these sales are executed using SIPs, while the remaining 53.3% employ asset 
sales. Public offerings of equity in the banks lead to diffuse ownership that favors 
entrenched management. IPO privatization usually results in only a partial government 
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divestiture of state ownership and in dispersed ownership. Hence, they fail to create an 
environment for the development of a modern, independent banking sector. In weak 
institutional environments share offerings produce lower performance gains than direct 
sales to strategic investors; SIPs in less developed countries (Czech , Egypt, Poland , 
Nigeria ) were less successful (Bonin et al. 2003). Cross country analysis in Otchere 
(2003) also shows few or no performance gains in banks sold through SIP. Problems 
arise because of the underdeveloped infrastructure for handling the processing of claims 
from a large number of small owners and due to the lack of absorption capacity of 
nascent domestic capital markets in which bank stocks dominate market capitalization. 
In such instances, bank SIPs may be prone to market manipulation, true reform of the 
banks may be delayed and the government may not realize as much revenue from the 
privatization process as it could. 
The attraction of privatization through asset sale is that such a transfer of 
ownership and control facilitates necessary changes in management, often transfers 
knowledge of modern banking techniques, and promises much needed capital injections. 
Control is transferred from the government to a new owner with the skills and financial 
capability to develop an independent, efficient bank. However, governments find it 
difficult to set a price for this control. If the price appears to be too low, the government 
is accused of giving away the bank to a powerful group or to a foreigner. If the price is 
too high, or if a hesitant government restricts the offer of control of bank assets and 
activities, there will be little interest from strategic investors. To further complicate the 
issue, potential investors who have the resources and interest in making hefty 
investments in not so healthy banking firms are often foreign financial institutions.      
There may be significant political resistance to foreign ownership of the domestic 
banking system. Asset sale often involve lengthy negotiations, which delay the 
privatization of the banking sector.  
In theory, voucher privatization provides a speedy transfer of ownership using an 
egalitarian process that does not favor any particular interest groups. Furthermore, it 
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avoids the need to set a price administratively for the transaction. The clearest 
disadvantage is that the transaction does not provide any revenue to the government or 
lead to any capital infusion to the privatized bank. Moreover, this method is likely to 
result in dispersed ownership and it is not conducive to achieving the primary goal of 
independent governance. As designed in the Czech Republic, voucher privatization of 
banks resulted in the transfer of less than fifty percent of the bank shares to individual 
and investment funds with no dominant strategic owner emerging. 
Both SIPs and voucher privatization provide attractive relatively quick means for 
the transfer of partial ownership but that is not the sole goal of privatization. These 
approaches do not facilitate the development of an independent market-oriented banking 
system. Such development requires a transfer of control of the bank and its assets to a 
strategic investor with the incentive to modernize the banking business. Although 
fraught with potential political problems, the role of a strategic investor is crucial and 
recent developments in transition countries suggest that this has now been accepted. 
(Bonin & Wachtel 1999) 
 
2.5  A brief description of bank privatization in three fast-track transition 
countries (Czech, Poland and Hungary) 
 
Before transition, banking sectors were designed to serve for a centrally planned 
economy in these three countries and were usually segmented functionally. A state 
savings bank, with an extensive branch network, collected virtually all household 
deposits. A foreign trade bank handled all transactions involving foreign currency. An 
agricultural bank provided short-term financing to the agricultural sector. A 
construction bank funded long-term capital projects and infrastructure development.    
During the first half of the 1990s, the first step in banking sector reform in the three 
countries involved creating a two-tier system with commercial banking activities carved 
out of the old central bank, the new banking sectors in these countries consisted of the 
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newly created commercial banks and the specialty banks, both types having universal 
banking licenses, along with a few foreign green-field banks and many relatively 
undercapitalized domestic private banks under lax entry requirements. 
 
The three countries embarked on significantly different bank privatization 
programs. Even before the political change, the Hungarian government had allowed 
three foreign banks to operate in the country from 1985. By the end of 1994, the 
Hungarian foreign trade bank had been purchased by a foreign owner and foreign 
investors held about 20% of total banking assets in Hungary. During the 1990s, the 
initial phase of the banking sector’s reform was consolidation. As the first step, the state 
executed a portfolio cleaning in 1992 1993. As consolidation failed to solve se‐ veral 
problems, full recapitalization of the Hungarian banking sector became indispensable. 
After the successful reconstruction and stabilization, the government decided to 
privatize commercial banks. Privatization aimed to attract mainly foreign strategic 
investors in order to get access to the necessary technological background, know how ‐
and management skills. After 1990s, the Hungarian financial system began to develop 
rapidly. At present, approximately 80% of the total Hungarian banking sector is in 
foreign hands as a result of the above described privatization process. Of the foreign 
investors, 85% is strategic investor: these are mainly foreign banks and other financial 
institutions. The remaining 20% is controlled by private investment companies and very 
few is controlled by state hand. 
 
The starting conditions were not favorable for the Czech financial sector. 
Compared to the other post-communist countries the situation of the Czech banking 
sector was even more complicated. At the beginning of the transformation, the SBCS’s 
(Central bank then) monetary policy relied mostly on administrative instruments. In line 
with the development of the payment system this situation steadily changed and the 
SBCS/CNB moved to standard market instruments. In 1992, Act on SBCS (22/1992) 
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and Act on Banks (21/1992) took effect – specification of banking license and banking 
supervision, fines, credit exposure rules, required capital of bank increased from CZK 
500 million to CZK 300 million . In 1994, Act on Banks amended – CNB empowered 
to lower capital of bank, conservatorship better specified, deposit insurance established, 
required capital increased to CZK 500 million; CNB issued regulation on loan 
classification and provisioning. In 1996, Regulation on bank loans issued (new risk 
weights for KoB, NPF and EGAP). In 1999-Stabilization Program, CNB issued 
regulations on capital adequacy of banks incorporating credit and market risks (effective 
1 April 2000) and on supervision on consolidated basis. In 2001, Act on the CNB and 
Act on Banks harmonized with EU legislation; deposit insurance scheme rules amended; 
Central Credit Register introduced. In Czech Republic, every single bank was privatized 
differently. due to the problem within banks´ balance sheets – NPLs (non-performing 
loans), low inflation environment and more restrictive monetary policy disabling a 
solution of existing debts by devaluating (unlike in other countries with higher 
inflation),a special institution was created to clean the banks´ balance sheets 
–Consolidation Bank, later Czech Consolidation Agency. After cleaning their balance 
sheets the banks were privatized (ended 2001, but the “cleaning up” process ended with 
the termination of the Czech Consolidation Agency on December 31, 2007.) In the 
Czech Republic, three of the largest four banks participated in the first wave of voucher 
privatization in 1992. Investment funds, the largest of which were created by these 
banks, were an integral part of the Czech voucher privatization program. Hence, this 
initial divestiture of state holdings resulted in interlocking ownership with the state 
retaining large controlling stakes of voucher-privatized Czech banks. At the end of 1994, 
although foreign investors held about 6% of banking assets in the Czech Republic, none 
of the large banks had any foreign ownership. Afterwards, the Czech government was 
late to recognize the importance of attracting strategic foreign investors, beginning with 
1998, bank privatization, including that of banks initially privatized by voucher method 
and then re-nationalized, was done by sell-to-foreign strategic investor method. 
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Presently, all the large banks in the Czech Republic are foreign-owned. 
 
In January 1989 the Sejm (The Polish Parliament) passed two Acts related to 
banking - the Banking Act and the Act on the National Bank of Poland, a two-tier 
structure of Polish banking was established. Another step in the process of the 
construction of a new banking system was the passing of three Acts aimed at the 
rehabilitation of the banking sector and at increasing its stability. The adopted 
privatization strategy allowed foreign strategic partners to take over the holding of no 
more than 30% of the total shares issued, it was also assumed that the State would retain 
about 30% of shares with voting rights limited to strategic decisions (with the option to 
dispose of this interest in the future) and the remaining shares (about 30%) would be 
offered to individual investors in a public offer and to employees, on privileged terms.  
The change of the government`s policy versus foreign capital was reflected in 1998 by 
the selling to foreign investors (Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank and Bank Austria 
AG) of significant equity holdings (representing 36.72 % and 33.3% of capital, 
respectively.) In accordance with the obligations assumed by Poland when joining the 
OECD, at the beginning of 1999 formal restrictions against foreign banks in respect of 
establishing branches were abolished. At the end of September 2001 the share of foreign 
capital (5.2 bn zloty) in the equity capital of commercial banks in Poland stood at 57.4%. 
The largest amounts were invested by German capital and by American capital. Assets 
controlled by the foreign capital as of the end of September 2001 amounted to 78.3% of 
the total assets of the sector. As of 2001 there were 75 commercial banks in Poland, 
with only one being state owned and 2 further banks having state majority capital. 
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3. Data and Methodology 
 
 
 3.1 Sample Data collection and Research approach 
 
The paper focuses on three fast-track transition countries-Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland-chosen because they had high levels of state ownership at some point in the 
1990s and undertook a relatively high number of privatizations. We mainly collect data 
from banking sector performance annual reports made by those countries´ Financial 
supervision Authorities, National banks and bank associations from 1995 through 2004, 
with a total of 576 observations. Since not all variables are available for all banks, fewer 
observations are included in some of the regressions. In our empirical analysis, we focus 
on the performance of banks that were privatized during the sample period. We also 
collect performance data from all large banks’ annual reports in CPH countries, because 
those large banks generally account for at least 2/3 of the whole banking sector in each 
country in CPH.  
 
In the bulk of our empirical analysis we focus on three performance measures. 
Return on assets (ROA) is profits relative to average total assets. Since some share of 
banks’ profits came from foreign exchange operations, in some specifications we use 
measures of ROA that exclude foreign exchange profits. Excluding foreign exchange 
operations should provide a better indication of banks’ profitability in financial 
intermediation. Secondly, we employ operating cost ratio(OC) to test banking efficiency 
in CPH. Finally, we also use the share of nonperforming loans (NPL)-the loan portfolio 
quality measure as a performance indicator. Data resources of these three indicators are 
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collected mainly from annual reports made by Financial Supervision Authorities in CPH, 
as well as by individual banks and bank associations. The details can be checked in the 
Appendix of this paper. Since data resources are dispersed in annual reports, some even 
can only be found in the articles of reports, the researcher can not get all data exhibited 
in the attached Appendix. 
 
We assess the effect of privatization on bank performance by analyzing the 
relationship between the structure change of ownership (the symbol of privatization) 
and bank performance( ROA,NPL,OC) during the sample period, while controlling for 
other bank characteristics, we use the following regression model: 
itit nivatizatiobaePerformanc Pr∗±=  
Where: itePerformanc  is the performance of bank i. over time t. As noted, this 
variable includes return on assets (ROA), non performing loans (NPL) and operating 
cost (OC).  
We use ROA excluding foreign exchange incomes. 
We use state ownership cut as the symbol of privatization of bank i. over time t. 
       
In Table 1 we document the structure change of state ownership (Privatization) in 
CPH during the sample period and thus we have Figure 1, the structure change trend 
Graph. It’s easy to find since 1995 privatization in this area has been progressing very 
fast, and during 1997-1999 the privatization was intensified and experienced very 
dramatic change, after this period the privatization in CPH has been undergoing steadily. 
1997-1999 can therefore be regarded as the changing time point of privatization effect 
on bank performance in this research. 
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Table 1: State ownership in % in CPH countries 
        1995   1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
Czech    17.6   16.6   17.5  18.6   23.1  23.6   4.3    4.1   4.4   4.4 
Poland    71.7   69.8   51.6  48.0   24.9  16.9   17.0  16.5  16.2  13.4  
Hungary  52.0   16.3   10.8   11.8  19.5   21.3   25.6  6.9   0.9   0.5 
Sources: Annual reports of Hungarian Financial Supervision Authority, National bank  
of Poland, National bank of Czech as well as annual reports of individual banks. In 
addition, data are also taken from Ceska Bankovni Asociace (Czech Republic) and 
Hungarian Banking Association from 1995 to 2004. 
 
Figure 1 
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We collect profitability and operating efficiency data during the sample period and 
made the table 2. It shows the performance of banking sectors in CPH countries over the 
whole sample period. Accompanying with privatization (here is the reducing of state 
ownership), banking sectors` annual profitability (ROA) in CPH countries has been 
improving gradually (somehow very significantly in Hungary) during the period, while 
the non-performing loan (NPL) reducing apparently (not very apparently in Poland) and 
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operating cost (OC) going down slightly. This indicates a positive performance effect of 
privatization in CPH and the indication is expressed vividly by Figure 2(a,b,c). 
 
Table 2a: Profitability and operating efficiency in CPH countries 
CZK 
million 
The end of 
each 
December 
Total 
assets 
Net profit Non 
performing 
Loan(%) 
ROA Operating 
Cost(%) 
2004 2635554 32852 4.1 1.3 1.8 
2003 2527701 30193 4.9 1.2 1.9 
2002 2503726 28170 8.1 1.1 1.9 
2001 2500308 16951 13.4 0.7 2.1 
2000 2255259 14385 19.1 0.6 2.2 
1999 2533895 -5628 21.5 -0.3 2.2 
1998 2424235 -8236 20.8 -0.4 2.2 
1997 2222313 -3356 22.2 -0.2 2.0 
1996 2033399 5059 24.3 0.3 2.0 
1995 1852236 1328 33.6 0.1 1.9 
 
Table 2b 
HUF 
Billion 
The end of 
each 
December 
Total assets Net profit Non  
performing 
Loan(%) 
ROA Operating 
Cost(%) 
2004 14,926.419 275.9 1.9 2.3 3.0 
2003 12,860.695 155.5 1.8 1.8 3.3 
2002 10,195.580 151.3 2.1 1.7 3.6 
2001 9,040.289 129.0 2.2 1.6 3.6 
2000 8,427.399 101.4 2.8 1.3 3.8 
1999 7,336.100 42.2 3.7 0.6 4.1 
1998 Na. 40.1 4.9 -2.2 4.0 
1997 Na. 58.7 4.7 -3.1 3.9 
1996 Na. 61.4 7.5 0.2 4.2 
1995 Na. 44.1 10.2 -5.8 3.7 
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Table 2c 
Million 
Polish Zloty 
The end of 
each 
December 
Total assets Net profit Non 
performing 
Asset(%) 
ROA Operating 
Cost(%) 
2004 538037.5 7292.5 15.5 1.5 3.1 
2003 488961.6 2345.4 21.8 0.5 3.3 
2002 467117.8 2338.3 22.0 0.5 3.4 
2001 469706.9 4233.4 18.6 1.0 3.5 
2000 428486.3 4212.3 15.5 1.0 3.6 
1999 363427.4 3180.8 13.7 1.0 3.6 
1998 318726.8 1824.9 11.2 0.7 3.7 
1997 247668.9 4495.6 11.0 2.1 3.7 
1996 197215.2 4420.5 13.2 1.2 3.6 
1995 149342.2 2848.3 25.7 0.9 3.5 
Sources: Annual reports of Hungarian Financial Supervision Authority, National bank 
of Poland, National bank of Czech as well as annual reports of individual banks. In 
addition, data are also taken from Ceska Bankovni Asociace (Czech Republic) and 
Hungarian Banking Association from 1995 to 2004. 
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Figure 2a: Time Series Plots for CPH countries 
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Figure 2b 
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Figure 2c 
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Further, we take CPH countries as a whole unit because they share a lot of 
sameness with each other politically and economically, then we use the mean of 
ownership structure change (Privatization) and the means of bank performance 
indicators (ROA,NPL,OC) from CPH countries from 1995 to 2004 to test the effect of 
privatization on bank performance in the whole CPH, again, we saw a positive 
performance effect of privatization below both by table 3 and by Figure 3. 
 
Table 3: The means of State ownership, ROA,NPL,OC in CPH countries 
Means 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
State 
owneriship 
47.1 34.2 26.6 26.1 22.5 20.6 15.6 9.2 7.2 6.1 
ROA -1.6 0.6 -0.4 -0.6 0.4 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.7 
NPL 23.2 15.0 12.6 12.3 13.0 12.5 11.4 10.7 9.5 7.2 
Operating cost 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.1 3.0 2.8 2.6 
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Figure 3 
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Finally, to assess the effect of privatization on bank performance, while controlling 
for other bank characteristics, we use the different ordinary regressions to examine the 
relationship between change of ownership (Privatization) and profitability (ROA), bank 
efficiency (OC), non-performing loans (NPL) respectively, additionally we put the 
means of these three performance indicators together along with the means of  
ownership change to test the relationship among them by regression. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 35 
 
 
3.2 Regression results and analyses 
 
 
  Based on the above table 3, We use Minitab15 in this research as the analytical tool 
to carry out following regression tests. State ownership cut is the symbol of 
Privatization in this research. 
3.2.1 Regression Analysis: ROA versus STAOWN  
The regression equation is 
ROA = 1.92 - 0.0684 STAOWN 
 
Table 4: Relationship between ROA and State ownership  
Y          X         Constant    Coef.     R-Sq    R-Sq(adj)    P-value 
ROA  State ownership    1.9211   -0.06836   74.8%     71.7%     0.001 
 
Figure 4 
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In this regression, R-Sq = 74.8%, P=0.001. Generally, state ownership cut or 
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privatization progressing is positively correlated with annual profitability (here is ROA) 
during the sample period in CPH. During 1995-1999, profitability in CPH is minus, 
because the privatization was concentrated and intensified in CPH, the main cause of 
the year-on-year ROA minus in overall was associated with the bank’s creating of 
reserves and provisions. Furthermore, the crisis in the Far East and in the Russian 
market affected the area’s economy, as well as the banking system. Besides, the 
technology updating and the construction of electronic banking in the area cost a lot and 
led to the profit decline. 
After 1999, the annual profitability has been improving year on year, the biggest 
component (accounting for around 61% of the total) was interest profit. Profit from fees 
and commissions was up by more than 13% yearly, making up one quarter of the total. 
This is because by using more advanced forms of electronic banking, customers can 
execute certain transactions themselves and banks can thus reduce the number of 
contact staff working in branches. Further, this increase in surplus profit is due on the 
one hand to the rise in profit and on the other hand to an annual decline in expenses (of 
more than 13%). The main cause of the year-on-year decline in overall regular expenses 
associated with bank’s operation, coverage of risks and costs arising from sales of 
low-quality assets and most importantly, thanks to improved loan portfolio quality , it 
was not necessary to create provisions and reserves in such large volumes as in previous 
years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 37 
 
3.2.2 Regression Analysis: NPL versus STAOWN  
 
The regression equation is 
NPL = 6.13 + 0.307 STAOWN 
 
Table 5: Relationship between non performing loans and state ownership  
Y        X          Constant    Coef     R-Sq     R-Sq(adj)   P-value 
NPL  State ownership    6.128    0.30726   87.0%     85.4%     0.001 
 
Figure 5 
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We have R-Sq = 87.0%, R-Sq(adj) = 85.4% here to suggest this high correlation 
between the two indicators. In this regression, we saw a significant correlation between 
the privatization and the loan portfolio quality. Accompanying with the privatization 
intensification and progressing, the non performing loans has been reducing fast. 
In CPH, Virtually until 2002, banking assets were cleaned up by transferring bad 
loans outside the banking sector with effective assistance from the state connected with 
the sale of the state's interests in large banks. Another factor is the now firmly 
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established increase in banks' prudence when assessing credit transactions. A 
considerable improvement in economic performance has fundamentally affected the 
financial condition of the entire corporate sector. And finally, there has been a shift in 
the loan portfolio structure towards loans provided to households, predominantly 
housing loans. Besides having high-quality collateral, this type of loan is associated 
with lower risk. The share lending to households was also increasing than that in the 
sector as a whole. The rising share of loans to households in total loans of the banking 
sector is thus positively affecting loan portfolio quality. 
3.2.3 Regression Analysis: OC versus STAOWN  
The regression equation is 
OC = 2.87 + 0.00987 STAOWN 
 
Table 6: Relationship between operating cost and state ownership  
Y        X             Constant   Coef   R-Sq   R-Sq(adj)   P-value 
OC   State ownership      2.8675  0.009873  29.3%  20.5%     0.000 
 
Figure 6 
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R-square here is low, showing a slight correlation with privatization progressing. 
This is because that banks in CPH under privatization have been applying new banking 
 39 
technology ( such as electronic banking, ATMs etc.) to the system and that cost really a 
lot.  
Nonetheless, we still find that operating cost is going down slightly over the period, 
as facilitating parallel growth in both the efficiency of banking activities and the quality 
of the services offered is the automation of certain operations, this reduces the number 
of outlets and the active participation of individual bank employees using 
state-of-the-art computer and communications technology. The various forms of 
electronic banking, from payment cards to trading via the Internet, are being used to an 
ever greater extent by banks in CPH now. The ongoing rationalization of work at the 
large banks’ head offices and the introduction of new technology into the organization 
of internal processes and distribution of banking services looks set to continue. In 
addition to improving the efficiency of bank management, these changes should 
continue to increase the range and quality of products and services offered by the 
banking sector.  
To expand the market, banks now are employing alternative distribution channels, 
direct banking and business network sharing within financial groups. They are also 
streamlining their existing branch networks. The branch network is going through a 
partial restructuring, with the distribution of banking units being tailored to changing 
client needs and current shifts in demand.  
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3.2.4 Additional Regression: Privatization versus bank performance 
STAOWN = - 37.6 - 2.67 ROA + 2.08 NPL + 11.0 OC 
 
Table 7: Relationship between state ownership and bank performance 
Y                 X             Constant   R-Sq   R-Sq(adj)   P-value 
State ownership   Performance       -37.60   93.0%   89.5%     0.001 
 
Figure 7 
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In this regression, we have R-Sq = 93.0%, R-Sq(adj) = 89.5%, P-value 0.001 
Very significant correlation was found between privatization and three bank 
performance indicators. This further confirmed that state ownership is followed by poor 
profitability, high non performing loans and low operating efficiency, totally in contrast 
to the situation of improved bank performance under privatization. During the 
privatization, foreign ownership plays an important role in improving bank performance 
in the CPH countries, we here leave this issue untouched due to poor data resources and 
time limitation of study. 
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 4.  Summary and Conclusion 
 
   According to theory, it was suggested that bank privatization has positive effect on 
bank performance ( Bonin, Wachtel et al ). As state ownership in banks normally leads 
to poor profitability, low efficiency and severe loan portfolio problem, thus privatization 
matters on bank performance ( Clarke, Cull et al ). 
In this paper, we first go through the literature and take this argument as this 
paper’s hypothesis, put it under test in three fast-track transition countries ( Czech, 
Poland and Hungary ), chosen because they had high levels of state ownership at some 
point in the 1990s and undertook a relatively high number of privatizations. Further, 
because they have a lot of sameness with china politically and economically. 
Based on the 30 annual reports, 576 observations from Financial Supervision 
Authorities, National banks, bank associations and from individual banks in these three 
countries from 1995 through 2004, we employ ordinary regressions to examine the 
relationship between state ownership cut, or, privatization and profitability, operating 
cost, non performing loans respectively. At last, we use means of the three performance 
indicators and put them together along with the mean of state ownership cut or 
privatization under regression test. The outcomes are positive between privatization and 
profitability, loan portfolio quality improvement, but slight correlated with operating 
efficiency. Overall, this research supports our hypothesis. 
In the CPH countries, foreign strategic investors played an important role during 
the whole privatization due to their high technology, sophisticated management and 
know-how techniques on bank performance improvement, we leave this issue not 
discussed because of the poor data resources and time limitation on study. 
China is embarking on a significant bank privatization now, the researcher hopes 
that this paper can be somehow meaningful to oncoming bank reform in china. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Annual balance sheet and income statement by: 
 
Polish Financial Supervision Authority 
Czech Financial Supervision Authority 
Hungarian Financial Supervision Authority 
National bank of Poland 
National bank of Czech 
National bank of Hungary 
Hungarian bank association 
Large banks` websites in the three countries ( Annual reports ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 55 
Annual reports from Czech Financial Supervision Authority 1995-2004 
 
 
 
 
 56 
Czech 
 
 
 
 
 
 57 
Czech 
 
 
 58 
Czech 
 
 59 
Czech 
 
 
 
 
 
 60 
Czech 
 
 
 
 
 61 
Czech 
 
 
 
 
 62 
Czech 
 
 
 
 
 63 
 
Annual reports from Hungarian Financial Supervision Authority 1995-2004 
 
 
 
 64 
Hungary 
 
 
 
 
 65 
Hungary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 66 
Hungary 
 
 
 
 
 67 
Annual reports from Polish Financial Supervision Authority 1995-2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 68 
Poland 
 
 
 
 
 69 
Poland 
 
 
 
 70 
Poland 
 
 
 
 
 71 
Poland 
 
 
 
 
